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Bioequivalence: The Regulatory Career 
of a Pharmaceutical Concept
daniel carpenter and dominique a. tobbell
summary: Generic drugs cannot be marketed without regulatory and clini-
cal demonstration of “bioequivalence.” The authors argue that the concept of 
“bioequivalence” is a joint regulatory and scientific creation, not purely a tech-
nical concept, and not purely a legal concept. It developed at the interstices of 
networks of pharmacologists, regulators, food and drug lawyers, and American 
and European policy makers interested in “generic” drugs. This article provides 
a situated perspective on the history of bioequivalence, which emphasizes the 
shaping role of the state upon scientific processes, networks of regulators and 
scientists, and the centrality of transnational dynamics in the formation of drug 
regulatory standards.
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Food and Drug Administration
The emergence of a vast generic drug industry in the United States and 
other nations would not have been possible without fundamental regula-
tory changes that were struck in the 1984 Hatch–Waxman Legislation.1 
93  Bull. Hist. Med., 2011, 85 : 93–131
An earlier version was presented at the Modern Medicines: New Perspectives in Phar-
maceutical History conference, American Institute for the History of Pharmacy, Madison, 
Wisconsin, October 18–19, 2008; the American Political Science Association annual meet-
ing, Toronto, Ontario, panel on Standardization and the State, September 3, 2009; and the 
Science, Technology and Public Policy Workshop at the University of Michigan, December 
7, 2009. For helpful conversations and suggestions, we acknowledge Jerry Avorn, John 
Carson, Arthur Daemmrich, Jeremy Greene, Rick Hall, Gregory Higby, Peter Barton Hutt, 
Suzanne White Junod, Desmond King, Shobita Parthasarathy, Marc Stears, Elaine Stroud, 
John Swann, and Margaret Weir. Rebecca Eisenberg and Harry Marks gave particularly 
detailed and thoughtful comments, and J. Richard Crout offered valuable advice and his-
torical perspective. All errors and omissions are ours. This essay is dedicated to the memory 
of Harry Marks. We miss him greatly.
1. In the United States alone, 70 percent of the 3.4 billion prescriptions filled at pharma-
cies are now completed with generic drugs.
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The Hatch–Waxman law—formally titled the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act (Pub. L. No. 98-417)—created a pathway for 
the emergence of a vast and legitimized market for generic drugs. The fun-
damental bargain struck in the legislation was an extension of patent life 
for “pioneer” molecules (those drugs considered new molecular entities), 
in exchange for a streamlined and legitimized federal approval process 
for generic versions of those pioneer molecules. The Hatch–Waxman law, 
in turn, depended crucially upon the infrastructure for demonstration of 
“bioequivalence” erected by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and cooperating organizations in the preceding two decades. Generic 
drugs cannot be marketed without regulatory and clinical demonstration 
of “bioequivalence”—namely, the demonstration that the generic drug not 
only is chemically identical to the pioneer molecule but also has identical 
effects within the human patient.
The celebrated bargain of the 1984 law has received healthy narration 
and study.2 Yet the conceptual structure on which that bargain rested—
the scientific, economic, and regulatory history of “bioequivalence” and 
related “bioavailability” concepts as they have developed in the past half 
century—has not. “Bioequivalence” gives legitimacy and reality to generic 
drugs. It implies that one pharmaceutical commodity can substitute for 
another in most (if not all) critical therapeutic respects, and by so doing 
bioequivalence establishes a framework for market transactions based 
upon price. It is a joint regulatory and scientific creation, not purely a 
technical construct, and not purely a legal concept. Bioequivalence devel-
oped at the interstices of state, commerce, professional and academic 
medicine, professional and academic pharmacy, administrative law, and 
even the politics of federalism. Its development was political in ways 
that have escaped appreciation by both contemporaries and historians. 
Bioequivalence pitted generic drug manufacturers against brand-name 
manufacturers, of course. Just as centrally, however, it pitted different 
organizational interests against one another—the FDA, U.S. Pharmaco-
poeia (USP) and the National Formulary (NF), and the American Medical 
2. Allan M. Fox and Alan R. Bennett, The Legislative History of the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Food and Drug Law Institute, 1987); 
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, “Overview of the Hatch–Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug 
Development Process,” Food and Drug Law J. 54 (1999): 187–94; Wendy H. Schacht and John 
R. Thomas, “Patent Law and Its Application to the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Examination 
of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (‘The Hatch–Wax-
man Act’)” (RL30756) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2000); Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, “The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation,” Health Aff. 
20, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 119–35.
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Association (AMA)—in an ongoing struggle for control of the conceptual 
turf at stake, and the policy authority that came with it.
The central action in the saga of bioequivalence was one taken by no 
single individual, but clearly some agents and organizations advanced 
the game more than others. The linkage of notions of “equivalence” 
and “availability” in the late 1960s and early 1970s both problematized a 
cozy equilibrium and unraveled a conceptual knot. As drug equivalence 
was construed less as a problem of applied chemistry and quality control 
and more as one involving little-understood questions of absorption 
and pharmacokinetics, a new conceptual space was opened. In this con-
ceptual space—as much regulatory as scientific, and shot through with 
uncertainty and even palpable fear—proposed standards and definitions 
could be set forth, some authorities could take the lead in concept fram-
ing while other authorities were put on the defensive, and combatants 
from numerous sides could tie the debate to dozens of related issues of 
policy and institutions.
The coevolution of bioequivalence and bioavailability made its way 
from debates over instrumentation to practices of rule making, and finally 
to legislation. The array of players in this game was vast, and the sphere of 
combat shifted from professional-medical realms to regulatory and legisla-
tive realms and back again. As debates located and relocated, they always 
retained much of the residue (scientific, political, methodological, admin-
istrative) that they acquired. Pharmacological discussions of equivalence 
echoed the regulatory debates that preceded them, and legislative battles 
exhibited the filtrated remainder of scientific concept formation.
The emergence of bioequivalence marks a conceptual history, a regu-
latory history, a history of medicine and of science, and, perhaps most 
vitally, a history of politics and policy. Important works in the historiogra-
phy of American governance have shed powerful light on the strength of 
what was formerly considered a weak American state.3 In food and drug 
regulation, these narratives have focused upon the various explicit and 
implicit powers of the FDA—its ability to set standards for the develop-
ment and marketing of new technologies, its ability to quash research 
and development projects in pharmaceuticals by giving mere hints of its 
likely disapproval, its position at the interstices of science, medicine, and 
3. William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” Amer. Hist. Rev. 113 (June 
2008): 752–72; Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Daniel 
P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation 
in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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marketplace. Chief among these is what scholars have called “conceptual 
power” in regulation—the ability of the regulator to secure public aims 
not through directive or even through agenda setting but through shaping 
patterns of thought, vocabulary, protocol, and method.4 For these reasons, 
among others, our inquiry combines sources and methods commonly 
used in the history of medicine and science with concepts and patterns 
commonly observed in the study of American political development.
As the American nation embarks upon a massive reform of its health 
care system, the setting of standards in governance of health treatments is 
also of more than academic interest. A key part of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is the creation of a national Patient-Cen-
tered Outcome Research Institute for comparative effectiveness research 
that would systematically (and with considerable public funding) conduct 
inquiries on which treatments worked better than others for a given dis-
ease. Significant funding for this endeavor was included in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, otherwise known as the Obama 
administration’s “stimulus package.” In order to be compared, however, 
treatments must share a common metric of performance against a disease 
condition, and they must occupy a place of minimal substitutability so as 
to compose something of both a marketplace and an experimental setting 
where comparisons are possible. Other scholars working in disciplines as 
diverse as history, sociology, and political science have also seized upon 
standard setting and “market making” as modes of regulation different 
from the interventionist model that has governed American public dis-
course for the past half century.5
4. Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1990); Philip J. Hilts, Protecting America’s Health: The FDA, Business and 
One Hundred Years of Regulation (New York: Knopf, 2003); Arthur Daemmrich, Pharmacopolitics: 
Drug Regulation in the United States and Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004); Daniel Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical 
Regulation at the FDA (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).
5. Sally Clarke, Regulation and the Revolution in United States Farm Productivity (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Christian Bonah, Christophe Masutti, Anne Rasmussen, 
and Jonathan Simon, eds., Standards in Pharmaceutical History: Harmonizing 20th Century Drugs 
(Paris: Editions Glyphe, 2010); Ana Romero, Christoph Gradmann, and Maria Santemases, 
eds., “Circulation of Antibiotics: Journeys of Drug Standards, 1930–1970” (preprint 1, 
European Science Foundation Networking Program DRUGS, May 2010); Jeremy Greene, 
“What’s in a Name? Generics and the Persistence of the Pharmaceutical Brand in American 
Medicine,” J. Hist. Med. Allied Sci. (forthcoming).
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Contests over Therapeutic Equivalence, 1950s and 1960s
The atmosphere of contention in which debates about equivalence 
emerged was the early Cold War politics of commodity price inflation, 
aversion to “big” business and monopoly, and the brightening glow of 
congressional theater. None of these were entirely new forces in American 
political economy, but their combination was new. At no previous time 
could a sitting senator such as Estes Kefauver (D-TN) simultaneously tap 
the expanse of the television medium in the United States, the powers of 
a chairmanship of a Senate subcommittee, and the particular antitrust 
currents of the 1950s that had been energized by inflation and by eco-
nomic citizenship. Kefauver’s hearings took square aim at the “markup” 
pricing of brand-name drug tablets, and he proposed federal legislation 
that mandated “generic switching” in physician prescribing, the promi-
nent listing of generic names along with trade names on drug labels and 
advertisements, and limitations on pharmaceutical patents.6
Questions about equivalence were thus caught up in larger battles 
about drug nomenclature and the incentives facing general practitioners 
and other physician prescribers. The Kefauver proposals reinvigorated 
earlier arguments between pharmacists’ associations and brand-name 
manufacturers about whether drugs should be called by their brand names 
or their trade names and whether physicians should be discouraged from 
prescribing brand names when generic alternatives were available. For 
their part, physicians’ associations tended to side with the brand-name 
manufacturers. The American Academy of General Practice in 1954 
openly disavowed any action to discourage the use of trademark names 
in prescription writing.
Brand-name manufacturers used many strategies against Kefauver’s 
plans, of course, but before, during, and after the Tennessee senator’s 
hearings they and their political organs tried to undermine the notion 
that generic drugs were truly equivalent to brand-name drugs. In a pam-
phlet titled “Misconceptions about So-Called ‘Generic Equivalent’ Drugs” 
(1961), the pharmaceutical industry’s policy research organization, the 
National Pharmaceutical Council (NPC) questioned the “confident asser-
tions” made by proponents of price regulation and mandated generic 
substitution “that the cost of medicines could be greatly reduced if 
6. Richard Harris, The Real Voice (New York: Macmillan, 1964); Richard McFadyen, Estes 
Kefauver and the Drug Industry (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1973); Dominique A. Tobbell, 
“‘Who’s Winning the Human Race?’ Cold War as Pharmaceutical Political Strategy,” J. Hist. 
Med. Allied Sci. 64, no. 4 (2009): 429–73.
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physicians would, or were compelled to, prescribe drugs by their generic 
or nonproprietary names rather than the brand names of manufacturers. 
This concept,” the pamphlet continued,
assumes that all generic-name drugs are identical; that all have identical 
therapeutic actions in the patient. . . . Are these assumptions true? Is it really 
desirable or much-less expensive, for you or a member of your family to take a 
generic-name drug, made by a manufacturer unknown to your physician or to 
you, when the course of a minor or serious illness depends upon the complex 
composition and actual action in the body of the preparation you take?7
The pamphlet offered a list of cases in which a “subtle and sometimes 
hazardous range of differences” between the brand-name molecule and 
the purported generic equivalent had been revealed. Analyses of sus-
tained-release amphetamine preparations showed that commonly avail-
able tablets delivered as little as one-third of the required dose; studies 
of larger generic tablets of Eli Lilly’s anticoagulant dicumarol showed 
that larger dosage tablets simply used a higher quantity of the inert base 
as opposed to a larger portion of the active ingredient; a fifty milligram 
pill was therapeutically equivalent to a twenty-five milligram pill. Generic 
tablets for the antituberculosis medicine p-aminosalycylic acid were coated 
with shellac, whose chemical structure destabilized from aging; observed 
blood levels of the acid after intake were less than considered therapeu-
tically effective.8
For two generations, the question of therapeutic equivalence had 
largely been addressed through analyses of chemical equivalence. In the 
1950s and early 1960s, among the sparse tools available to pharmacolo-
gists to address these questions were dissolution studies and urinalysis 
(“excretion studies”). In the main, blood plasma analysis was considered 
too expensive to be conducted routinely of most tablet drugs, and plasma 
measurements for most drugs were not developed. Combined with the 
FDA’s well-honed good manufacturing practices (GMPs)—a list of pro-
duction control standards that quickly became an industry-wide template 
in the late 1940s and 1950s—chemical equivalence tests rounded out the 
complement of tools available to monitors in the USP and regulators at 
the FDA.9 In the customary generic drug application, a “paper NDA” or, 
7. National Pharmaceutical Council, “Misconceptions about So-Called ‘Generic Equiva-
lent’ Drugs” (New York: National Pharmaceutical Council, 1961), copy in Records of the 
U.S. Pharmacopoeial Convention (B82, F11), Wisconsin State History Society, Madison, 
Wis. (hereafter, USP Records).
8. Ibid., 5–6.
9. John P. Swann, “The 1941 Sulfathiazole Disaster and the Birth of Good Manufacturing 
Practices,” PDA J. Pharmaceut. Sci. Technol. 53, no. 3 (May 1999): 148–53.
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after 1969, an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) would combine 
manufacturing controls data with chemical equivalence demonstrations. 
The paper NDA attached these to aggregated “paper” evidence (from the 
published medical literature and from the FDA’s review documents) of 
the molecule’s effectiveness. Yet even a successful paper NDA or ANDA 
left the brand-name manufacturer in the position of being able to argue 
that only the brand-name product had been the subject of direct clinical 
investigations by medical authorities and by the FDA.
In this environment of weak knowledge and uncertainty, the aim of 
the brand-name manufacturers’ political campaign against generic drugs 
was clear. Attacking the plausibility of generic substitution required an 
assault upon the equivalence of generic drugs as well as institutions that 
served to bolster equivalence claims. Hence part of the NPC’s criticisms 
was aimed at the USP, which since the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act had 
certified drugs for their strength, purity, and potency. Citing the Kefauver 
hearings testimony of FDA commissioner George Larrick and even USP 
director Lloyd Miller, the council’s pamphlet declared that
the mere presence of “U.S.P.” on a label is in itself no assurance that contents 
meet official standards. The product may not even comply with minimum stan-
dard requirements. The U.S.P. may also permit differences of ingredients added 
in formulating a product. These may exert differences in therapeutic response.10
Neither the thalidomide episode nor the Kefauver–Harris Amendments 
nor the Investigational New Drug (IND) regulations of 1963 broke open 
this stalemate. The patent provisions of the Kefauver bill did not pass, and 
mandatory generic prescribing also failed to become law. In one impor-
tant domain of contestation, the brand-name drug makers lost. The FDA 
was charged with creating a new system of drug nomenclature that would 
allow for easier comparisons among molecules. Yet the amendments did 
not create a system for the official establishment of “therapeutic equiva-
lence.” In many respects, considering the vast policy opening created by 
the thalidomide scare and Frances Kelsey’s public triumph of the summer 
of 1962, the industry trade association, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA), and the NPC had dodged a bullet.
It comes as little surprise, then, that in the years immediately fol-
lowing the 1962 amendments, brand-name manufacturers continued 
their attack on the plausibility of generic equivalence. In a June 1965 
address to the Hillsboro County Medical Association in Tampa, Florida, 
A. E. Slesser of Smith, Kline & French Laboratories hammered away at 
10. National Pharmaceutical Council, “Misconceptions” (n. 7), 6.
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the “myth of generic ‘equivalency.’” Slesser pointed to the oft-repeated 
slogan of brand-name manufacturers—chemical equivalence did not 
imply “therapeutic equivalence,” and the identity of a “drug product” (a 
dosage form) did not map cleanly into the identity of the “drug” per se 
as a therapeutic agent. In the years after 1962, Slesser and other indus-
try spokesmen skillfully reappropriated the language and terms of the 
Kefauver–Harris Amendments and of pharmacological reformers of an 
earlier generation, reminding their audiences that the core question in 
thinking about generic substitution was not cost but “efficacy.” “There 
is only one way of assuring the therapeutic efficacy of a drug product,” 
Slesser reminded his Tampa listeners, “and that is by properly designed 
and controlled clinical tests.”11
The increasingly regulated nature of brand-name companies’ endeav-
ors, then, conferred what their officials saw as a saleable advantage in 
reputation. Neither the generic firms themselves nor the USP could, in 
this rendering, approach the exhaustive processes governed by the FDA 
and regularly executed by the “reputable” brand-name manufacturer. In 
making this argument, Slesser depicted brand-name drug synthesis and 
manufacture as an essentially bureaucratic enterprise:
The reputable manufacturer (and the FDA!) recognizes the indispensability of 
in-process controls in assuring drug quality and assuring validity of sampling 
and test results throughout the manufacture of each batch. His in-process 
controls consist of such things as records and reports giving results of required 
tests and inspections. Records, such as the results of tests throughout the 
manufacture of each batch as it is being compressed; control chart records of 
the fill accuracy of capsules as the batch is being encapsulated; signatures of 
operators and supervisors attesting to the double and triple weight and iden-
tity checks that have been made on each component in the compounding of 
the batch; signatures of operators and supervisors denoting that the correct 
working directions were used in compounding the batch; yield checks; ana-
lytical reports, etc.12
The kinds of assessments—“double and triple weight and quality checks”—
that allowed for faithful attributions of therapeutic equivalence were pos-
sible, Slesser implied, only in the corporately organized pharmaceutical 
companies that developed, synthesized, and packaged molecules. What 
larger pharmaceutical companies offered was not merely a more robust 
11. A. E. Slesser (assistant technical director, SK&F Labs), “The Myth of Drug Product 
‘Equivalency’” (address, Hillsboro County Medical Association meeting, June 1, 1965), 
copy in USP Records.
12. Ibid., 9–10.
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development enterprise but a built-in system of redundancies and evalu-
ation points that, together with brand-name dynamics, generated a more 
stable end product.
Congressional Critique: The Chemical “Inequivalence” of 
Generic Drugs
In spite of Slesser’s assertions, Congress was skeptical of such claims of 
brand-name superiority. Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) had taken over the 
prescription drug reform mantle following Kefauver’s death, and it was as 
chair of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business that Nelson began 
his own investigation into the American pharmaceutical industry in 1967. 
Like Kefauver, Nelson regarded mandatory generic prescribing as the solu-
tion to rising prescription and health care costs, and he joined with others 
in Congress (Joseph Montoya and Russell Long, in particular) and in state 
legislatures to push for the use of generic drugs for all welfare patients and 
to secure prescription drug benefits for seniors under Medicare.13
To defend against congressional calls for mandatory generic prescrib-
ing, the brand-name manufacturers, led by the PMA, did as they had 
since passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments: they attacked the concept 
of generic equivalence. This meant the mobilization of a vigorous public 
relations and political campaign aimed at undermining the notion that 
generic drugs were truly equivalent to their brand-name counterparts. 
In addition to the NPC’s “Misconceptions about So-Called ‘Generic 
Equivalent’ Drugs,” the PMA circulated among physicians’ offices and 
pharmacies and congressional members and staffers two other pamphlets 
that warned of the dangers of making generic prescribing mandatory, 
“Compulsory Generic Prescribing—A Peril to the Health Care System” 
and “Drugs Anonymous?” The latter warned that such action “could 
and probably would bring about deterioration in the quality of medical 
care—through the wide sale of substandard products—by discouraging 
the struggle for excellence which has marked the astounding progress 
in the pharmaceutical field—and by impeding drug research on which 
future progress depends.”14 
13. Dominique A. Tobbell, “Pharmaceutical Networks: The Political Economy of Drug 
Development in the United States, 1945–1980” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 
2008), esp. 191–232.
14. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), “Drugs Anonymous?” (Washing-
ton, D.C.: PMA, 1967), National Museum of American History, Parke-Davis Collection, box 
1964, quotation from p. 15. For information on “Compulsory Generic Prescribing—A Peril 
to the Health Care System,” see Senator Gaylord Nelson, “Drug Quality Standards,” Cong. 
Rec. 113, no. 5 (1967): 5630–31.
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On the congressional stage, representatives from brand-name manufac-
turers testified in front of Nelson’s subcommittee as to the superiority of 
their products compared to the generic versions produced by small, non-
research-based companies. In 1967 the PMA’s president, C. Joseph Stetler, 
cited a recent Parke-Davis study that had compared the equivalence of its 
own brand of chloramphenicol (Chloromycetin) and several generic ver-
sions of the drug and found that some of the generic drugs were absorbed 
into the blood stream of human volunteers at rates remarkably different 
from the Parke-Davis brand. Subsequently, the FDA withdrew nine of the 
generic chloramphenicol drugs from the market.15 Here, Stetler argued, 
was clear evidence that “[a]lthough two products may contain, or are 
supposed to contain, the same amount of the same active ingredient, this 
provides no assurance that both products will produce the same clinical 
effect in any particular patient.”16 Because the inactive ingredients that 
made up a drug product influenced the absorption and efficacy of the 
drug’s active ingredient, Stetler’s point made clear that containing the 
same amount of active ingredient was not enough to guarantee the thera-
peutic equivalence of a generic drug. Stetler’s argument thus extended 
brand-name manufacturers’ opposition to generic equivalence beyond the 
assertion that generic firms lacked sufficient quality control procedures. 
There was a modest rhetorical shift here, one pointing not to new stan-
dards but to doubts about what equivalence meant and how to measure it. 
Brand-name companies sought to exploit this uncertainty, which created 
a partial but effective therapeutic rationale against generic prescribing.
In the absence of comparative data, brand-name manufacturers held 
up the regulatory process as a guarantee of brand-name superiority. 
Despite the lack of comparative clinical data to support his point, Ciba’s 
president, Charles T. Silloway, argued that Ciba’s brand of reserpine (Ser-
pasil) was much better than the reserpine manufactured by the generic 
firm, American Pharmaceutical Corp, “[b]ecause ours consistently meets 
the standards of the USP and exceeds them, and because our product has 
15. On October 19, 1967, the FDA withdrew certification of generic versions of chlor-
amphenicol produced by the firms McKesson Laboratories, Continental Laboratories, the 
Pharmusa Corporation, the Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corporation, Rachelle Laboratories, 
and Westward, Inc. after laboratory tests showed Parke-Davis’s Chloromycetin brand entered 
the bloodstream faster than its generic competitors. “FDA Limits Drug to One Company,” 
New York Times, December 22, 1967, 29; FDC Reports, November 6, 1967, T&G 7.
16. “Statement of C. Joseph Stetler, President, PMA,” Competitive Problems in the Drug 
Industry, Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business; Monopoly 
Subcommittee, 1967–1977 (hereafter Nelson Hearings), November 16, 1967, 1367–1400, 
quotation on 1367. 
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been extensively clinically studied. Their product had not been.”17 In the 
arena of regulatory standards, the brand-name manufacturers had a point: 
although the 1962 Drug Amendments mandated that all new chemical 
entities (and therefore brand-name drugs) undergo rigorous clinical 
evaluation before the FDA could grant marketing approval, generic drugs, 
named for the very fact that they were not new chemical entities, fell out 
of the purview of any such requirement and were granted approval merely 
upon demonstration of their chemical equivalence to their brand-name 
counterpart. As is discussed below, this two-tiered regulatory process gave 
scientific credibility to the PMA’s critique.
In their effort to undermine Nelson’s bid, the PMA had as its ally the 
AMA. Although the AMA’s membership and political legitimacy had 
dwindled during the previous decade, the physician group was still a for-
midable force in health care policy. Following passage of Medicaid and 
Medicare, the AMA leadership criticized any legislative effort—including 
mandatory generic prescribing—that looked to grant the federal govern-
ment any further control over medical practice. In an editorial in the 
AMA News, the physician group argued that physicians prescribed drugs 
by brand name so that they could be confident in the drugs’ quality. Any 
“[l]egislation that would nullify this knowledge [about quality] by remov-
ing the decision-making power from him,” the AMA asserted, “clearly is 
not in the public interest.”18
Despite the PMA’s campaign, Nelson was unconvinced by the testi-
mony of representatives from brand-name manufacturers and the AMA. 
Instead, as he heard repeated testimony from representatives of hospital 
formulary committees and municipal and state welfare agencies who 
attested to the success of using generic drugs in their programs, Nelson 
labeled the brand-name manufacturers’ assertions of generic inequiva-
lence as “gobbledygook” and accused them of “broad-scale” propaganda 
17. “Statement of Charles T. Silloway, President, Ciba Pharmaceutical Co.,” Nelson Hear-
ings, September 14, 1967, 896–922, quotation on 907.
18. AMA, “Generic Prescribing Doesn’t Guarantee Lower Drug Costs, Chicago Survey 
Shows” (news release, May 26, 1967), cited in Milton Silverman and Philip R. Lee, Pills, 
Profits, and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 147, 364n16. On AMA 
opposition to the FDA and on AMA–PMA alliances, see also Harry M. Marks, “Making Risks 
Visible: The Science & Politics of Adverse Drug Reactions,” in Ways of Regulating: Therapeutic 
Agents between Plants, Shops and Consulting Rooms, ed. Jean-Paul Gaudillière and Völker Hess 
(preprint 363, Berlin: Max Planck Institute für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2008), 105–22; 
and Dominique A. Tobbell, “‘Eroding the Physician’s Control over Therapy’: The Post-War 
Politics of the Prescription,” in The American Prescription from the New Deal to the New Mil-
lennium, ed. Elizabeth Watkins and Jeremy Greene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, forthcoming).
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“with the obvious purpose to destroy public confidence in the official 
standards and the general quality of drug products.”19 At the root of the 
issue of generic equivalence, however, lay a very real scientific concern: 
was chemical equivalence (the current regulatory standards required for 
generic drug approval) a guarantee of therapeutic equivalence?
The Coevolution of Availability and Equivalence
The PMA’s was a campaign to sow doubt, and that campaign succeeded in 
part because the doubt was not unreasonable. As early as 1961, academic 
pharmacists expressed grave misgivings about the tools of their trade 
as a number of studies raised problems with the concept of therapeutic 
equivalence. The most significant step in the evolution of regulatory stan-
dards came in the regulatory linkage established between the concepts of 
equivalence and “biological availability.” The emergence of generic drug 
equivalence standards was in large measure the coevolution of “bioavail-
ability” and “bioequivalence” concepts, or in the coevolution of a bio-
logical standard and an associated regulatory standard. It is important 
to state what this transformation was not. It was not the case of a purely 
“scientific” development driving changes in regulation. Nor was it the 
case of a “regulatory development” driving science.
The notion of the availability of a therapeutic or nutritional ingredi-
ent had been under study among agricultural researchers, nutrition and 
physiology scholars, food and drug specialists, and others since the 1920s. 
At the core of these studies was a problem that long bothered observers 
of animal nutrition but was poorly solved in human pharmacokinetics as 
of the early 1970s. As two Texas experiment station researchers described 
their problem in 1948,
[t]he nutritive value of a protein is dependent not only upon its content of 
essential amino acids but the biological availability of these amino acids as 
well. Incomplete digestion and absorption of an essential amino acid has the 
result of altering the effective composition of a food protein. The ultimate 
synthesis of body protein from the amino acids made available through diges-
19. “Statement of Charles T. Silloway” (n. 17), 908; Gaylord Nelson, “Therapeutic Equiva-
lency of Drugs,” Cong. Rec. 115, no. 5 (1969): 6426–28, esp. 6427. Testifying in support of 
generic prescribing were groups representing senior citizens (e.g., “Statement of James L. 
Browning,” Nelson Hearings, May 15, 1967, 122–27), representatives from hospitals with suc-
cess using formularies of generic drugs (e.g., “Statement of Dr. Harold F. Newman,” Nelson 
Hearings, May 17, 1967, 219–27), and representatives of municipal and state governments 
with experience purchasing generic drugs for their hospital and welfare programs (e.g., 
“Statement of Dr. James G. Haughton,” Nelson Hearings, June 8, 1967, 383–97).
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tion and absorption is dependent on a third factor, namely, the simultaneous 
appearance in the blood stream of each of the essential amino acids in suit-
able proportion.20
These discussions of “biological availability” floated among disciplinary 
conversations in nutrition, physiology, and pharmacology for much of the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. By the early 1960s, a slate of studies and their 
clinical and methodological implications began to worry officials at the 
NF and the USP. The central studies had been conducted by antibiotic 
researchers, by Scandinavian tuberculosis researchers, and by University 
of Buffalo academic pharmacist Gerhard Levy and his colleagues. Studies 
from 1947 onward demonstrated that dicalcium phosphate administered 
with tetracycline appreciably depressed absorption of the antibiotic. In the 
1950s and early 1960s, other researchers showed that crystalline novobio-
cin acid was absorbed in ways starkly different from amorphous novobiocin 
acid and that the diuretic spironolactone differed markedly across dosage 
forms in its absorption into the blood stream. Studies soon showed vary-
ing ranges of activity in commonly used steroids, including prednisone.21
A series of studies conducted during the 1950s and early 1960s by 
researchers at the Food and Drug Directorate (FDD) of Canada’s Depart-
ment of National Health and Welfare raised concerns about existing phar-
macopoeial standards of equivalence, particularly dissolution and disinte-
gration tests. As the FDD researchers noted, while “various disintegration 
methods and times are specified in pharmacopoeias . . . few attempts have 
been made by the pharmaceutical industry or by regulatory bodies to 
relate such tests to quantitative measures of the physiological availability of 
the ingredients of the tablets.” The FDD researchers had hoped through 
their studies of various vitamin and drug products to delineate the rela-
tionship between in vitro disintegration times and biological availability 
(as measured using in vivo urinary excretion studies). Instead they found 
that for several drug products in vitro disintegration times were an inad-
equate measure of availability and thus did not guarantee the biological 
equivalence of the drug products. The FDD researchers also found that 
sustained-release and delayed-release dosage forms of a number of drug 
20. K. A. Kuiken and Carl M. Lyman, “Availability of Amino Acids in Some Foods,” J. 
Nutr. 36 (1948): 359–68, quotation on 359.
21. D. G. Chapman, R. Crisafio, and J. A. Campbell, “The Relation between in Vitro Dis-
integration Time of Sugar-Coated Tablets and Physiological Availability of Sodium p-Ami-
nosalicylate,” J. Amer. Pharmaceut. Assoc. (Sci. Ed.) 45 (1956): 374–78; J. D. Mullins and T. J. 
Macek, “Some Pharmaceutical Properties of Novobiocin,” J. Amer. Pharmaceut. Assoc. (Sci. 
Ed.) 49 (1960): 245–48; Gerhard Levy, “Availability of Spironolactone Given by Mouth,” 
Lancet (October 6, 1962): 723–24.
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products produced inadequate bioavailability, adding to concerns about 
the therapeutic equivalence of different dosage forms.22
At the National Formulary Committee meeting of September 1961, 
University of California pharmacist Einar Brochmann-Hansen expressed 
a commonly shared sense of methodological humility.
Like so many of us who are concerned about drug standards as a means of 
quality control, I had fallen into the rut of thinking almost entirely in terms 
of the identity, purity and quantity of active ingredient present in the dosage 
form; that any brand of the same drug which would meet the official specifica-
tions with regard to these and other requirements, would be therapeutically 
equivalent. Recently, a handful of people in this country and elsewhere have 
been making a lot of noise telling us that the situation is not nearly as simple 
as that. . . . It is not enough that the active ingredient is of the right identity 
and purity and is present in the labeled quantity. It must also be available for 
absorption if the drug is going to show the desired pharmacological effect.23
The problem, as Brochmann-Hansen perceived it, lay in the limits of the 
dissolution test. “Here we come to the crux of the matter: the disintegra-
tion time test tells us very little, if anything, about the physiologic avail-
ability of the drug.”24
At the USP, director of revision Lloyd C. Miller watched these devel-
opments with organizational alarm. The USP was the author of the stan-
dards that generic drugs were required to meet, and the organization 
developed these “reference standards” in consultation with state colleges 
of pharmacy, a pattern of consultation and collaboration that dated to 
the nineteenth century. These standards were based upon the physical 
amount and chemical purity of active ingredients.
In the early 1960s, Miller began to hear from longtime colleagues in 
his and related disciplines—Dale Friend of Harvard Medical School and 
22. D. G. Chapman, L. G. Chatten, and J. A. Campbell, “Physiological Availability of 
Drugs in Tablets,” Can. Med. Assoc. J. 76, no. 2 (1957): 102–6, quotation on 103; A. B. Mor-
rison and J. A. Campbell, “The Relationship between Physiological Availability of Salicylates 
and Riboflavin and in Vitro Disintegration of Enteric Coated Tablets,” J. Amer. Pharmaceut. 
Assoc. 49, no. 7 (1960): 473–78; A. B. Morrison, C. B. Perusse, and J. A. Campbell, “The 
Relationship between in Vitro Disintegration Time and in Vivo Release of Vitamins from a 
Triple-Dose Spaced-Release Preparation,” J. Pharmaceut. Sci. 51, no. 7 (1962): 623–26; and 
Denys Cook, “History of Bioavailability Testing at the Food and Drug Directorate,” Revue 
Canadienne de Biologie 32, supplement (1973): 157–62.
23. Einar Brochmann-Hansen, “Physiological Availability of Drugs in Pharmaceutical 
Dosage Forms” (presented at the National Formulary Committee meeting, Washington, 
D.C., September 22, 1961), 1, USP Records.
24. Ibid., 1. 
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the Brigham Hospital in Boston and Walter Modell, a clinical pharmacolo-
gist at Cornell University Medical College. Friend and Modell expressed 
concern not only about the problem of therapeutic equivalence but also 
about what the implications of this issue were for the relevance of the USP. 
Friend wrote that “sooner or later we certainly are going to have to take 
some cognizance of the problem of compounding and biological availabil-
ity.” Two weeks earlier Modell had confided to Miller that “the problem 
of ‘pharmacologic’ availability of drugs concerns me. It seems to me that 
little is to be found in the literature at this time about this aspect of new 
drug preparations. It seems to me also that U.S.P. can deal with it only by 
broadening the scope of its operations. Let’s talk about it.” In a subsequent 
phone conversation, Modell expressed his fear that the bioavailability 
problem was “different for almost every drug,” so much so that the “USP 
cannot provide standards with its present state of knowledge.”25 And in 
meetings he attended, Miller began to realize that the legitimacy of the 
USP determinations was in trouble. In a circular sent around in Septem-
ber 1961, he acknowledged that “it will be clear at once from the reports 
that a new kind of official standard is needed, i.e., one that may well be 
too complex to apply to every batch of product. If so, this will represent 
a most significant departure in approach to drafting drug standards.”26
Nor could the FDA’s GMPs assist well with this problem. GMPs could 
address the problem of quality control—variability from tablet to tablet in 
chemical composition. Yet the new studies were suggesting that, over the 
course of the administration of a drug, there was “physiological” or “bio-
logical” variance within the individual patient. So too that across different 
forms of tablet and dosage form, there was striking variance in availability 
even when the manufacturing controls had been fully satisfied.
Smith, Kline & French officials held a small conference on “physiologic 
availability” in 1963 in Philadelphia, and Miller attended the meeting of 
the “Tablets Committee.” Officials from numerous brand-name firms 
were in attendance—Squibb, Abbott, Parke-Davis, Upjohn—along with 
Gerhard Levy from the University of Buffalo. From the discussion Miller 
learned that in the coming decade of control testing, the “[i]nfluence of 
Govt. will steadily increase.” John Wagner of Upjohn presented data that 
showed two different dosage forms of the company’s star product tolbu-
tamide issued in markedly different blood sugar levels over a twelve-hour 
25. Friend to Miller, November 25, 1963; Modell to Miller, November 13, 1963; notes 
from phone conversation (probably Miller’s handwriting), n.d., USP Records.
26. Miller, “Physiological Availability and Homogeneity in U.S.P. Dosage Forms,” circular 
30, U.S.P. Committee of Revision, September 28, 1961, 108, USP Records.
05_85.1carpenter.indd   107 4/7/11   10:24 AM
108 daniel carpenter and dominique a. tobbell
time span, and upon sketching the plot of Wagner’s data, Miller noted 
the conclusion that USP and NF standards needed to be “revamped” (see 
Figure 1).27
27. Miller, Notes from “Conf. on Physiological Availability,” March 28, 1963, USP Records. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, Wagner worked with the Bureau of Drugs under a consulting 
contract.
Figure 1. U.S. Pharmacopoeia Revision Director Lloyd Miller’s notes on the avail-
ability of Tolbutamide, 1963. Reprinted with permission of The United States 
Pharmacopeial Convention, Rockville, Maryland. Source: Wisconsin State History 
Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
Wagner’s presentation on tolbutamide, combined with Miller’s anx-
ious notes on it, marks a turning point in the organizational politics and 
conceptual structure of the bioequivalence debate. Wagner’s imagery 
presented a powerful challenge to existing standards of equivalence 
determination—many of them “owned and operated” by the USP. And 
discussions of physiological availability gestured to the wide gulf between 
chemical equivalence and therapeutic equivalence, not merely at any one 
time but also in ways that were dynamic and dose dependent.
DES and the Transformation of New Drug Review
As the issue of therapeutic equivalence gained legislative traction during 
the Nelson hearings, a series of advisory bodies—working at the behest of 
government officials—entered into the debate over generic drugs and their 
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substitutability for more expensive molecular therapies. In 1967, the Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare established a Task Force on Prescrip-
tion Drugs—composed of government officials, some without medical or 
scientific training—to determine the feasibility of expanding the Medicare 
program to include prescription drug coverage. Part of the Task Force’s 
study included an assessment of the benefits of using generic drugs, which 
in turn included an assessment of the matter of therapeutic equivalence.28
As part of its evaluation, the Task Force initiated a program to deter-
mine whether any observed differences in biological equivalence (or 
bioequivalence) could be related to differences in the physical or chemi-
cal characteristics of the products (such as particle size, crystal form, and 
adjuvants used such as fillers, lubricants, binders, coatings, etc.). The Task 
Force selected twenty-seven drugs (considered to be the most critical) to 
study in clinical trials. Beginning in late 1967, bioequivalency studies on 
these products were conducted in human volunteers in FDA laboratories; 
at Georgetown University, under FDA contract; and at the Public Health 
Service Hospital in San Francisco. While on-site physicians and researchers 
conducted the studies, the Task Force oversaw the equivalency trials. The 
Task Force projected that these clinical trials would be complete and the 
data on hand by 1971. In the meantime, based on reviews of the current 
literature on therapeutic equivalence and through assessments of the use 
of generic drugs in foreign drug programs, in leading American hospitals, 
in state welfare programs, in Veterans Administration and Public Health 
Service hospitals, and in American military operations—where few cases 
of inequivalency with therapeutic consequences had been reported—the 
Task Force concluded, “[o]n the basis of available evidence, lack of clini-
cal equivalency among chemical equivalents meeting all official standards 
has been grossly exaggerated as a major hazard to the public health.”29
The Task Force’s findings were a boon to Nelson. Yet the matter of 
therapeutic equivalence was far from resolved. As part of the 1962 Drug 
Amendments, the FDA was required to review the efficacy of all drugs 
marketed between 1938 and 1962, some four thousand drugs. Without 
the resources to conduct the review itself, the FDA contracted the work 
out to the National Research Council, which oversaw the efficacy review 
and coordinated the recruitment of thirty advisory panels composed of 
almost two hundred academic physicians deemed experts in critical areas 
28. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, “Final 
Report of the Task Force on Prescription Drugs” (Washington, D.C., 1969), iii.
29. Ibid., 31–34, quotation on 31. For discussion of the Task Force and particularly its 
oversight of equivalency trials, see Silverman and Lee, Pills, Profits, and Politics (n. 18), 151–62.
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of drug evaluation to perform the evaluations; this came to be called the 
Drug Efficacy Study (DES).30 The DES panels based their evaluations of 
each drug on published studies, the original new drug application (NDA) 
and other materials on file with the FDA, the drug’s package insert, sup-
plemental material (usually unpublished studies) provided by the manu-
facturer, and the panel members’ experiences using the drug in clinical 
practice.31 The DES completed the evaluations in just three years, after 
which time the FDA decided, based on the DES’s reports, which drugs 
were to be pulled from the market because they did not have sufficient 
evidence of efficacy and which drugs required labeling changes to more 
accurately reflect the DES’s findings.
The DES included the evaluation of brand-name and generic drugs 
and thus directly confronted the matter of the therapeutic equivalence 
of generic drugs. During the evaluation process, however, the DES panels 
found that for many of the generic drugs studied, there was no evidence 
available to show that the generic drugs were in fact therapeutically equiva-
lent to their brand-name counterpart. Rather, all the DES panels could say 
about a generic drug’s efficacy was whether that generic drug was chemically 
equivalent to a brand-name drug whose efficacy had been determined.32
This problem was due to what the Policy Advisory Committee (PAC) 
of the DES regarded as a double standard in the regulatory process. The 
manufacturer of a brand-name drug had to apply to the FDA for a supple-
mentary NDA, for any change in formulation, no matter how slight, and 
in so doing provided to the FDA therapeutic equivalence data for any and 
all changes. Meanwhile, the manufacturer of a generic drug was required 
to supply only proof of the drug’s chemical equivalence to the already-
approved brand-name drug. By “rendering decisions on the efficacy of 
‘generic’ drugs” and “accepting inadequate ‘in vitro’ tests as adequate 
evidence of therapeutic equivalency,” the PAC believed the DES violated 
the letter of the 1962 Drug Amendments because without clinical data, 
“we have no idea of the efficacy in man of many of the generic drugs that 
30. Governing Board, National Research Council, minutes of NRC Governing Board 
meeting, April 24, 1996, appendix 7.2, NAS Archives, Medical Sciences, DRB folder, Com-
mittee on Drug Efficacy Review Ad Hoc 1966.
31. Ralph G. Smith, “The Drug Efficacy Study of the NAS-NRC,” November 19, 1968, 
NAS Archives, series 1 DES, DES of NAS-NRC, Smith R G 1968.
32. R. Keith Cannan, “The Drug Efficacy Study of the NAS-NRC: A Talk Given at the Sixth 
Annual Briefing in Science Council for the Advancement of Science Writing, November 
11, 1968,” NAS Archives, series 1 DES, Speeches on History and Work of DES by Cannan, 
Gilman, and Trexler, 1966–68.
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we have declared to be effective.”33 In light of this, the PAC added an 
addendum to each drug evaluation submitted by the DES to the FDA:
Drugs of identical chemical composition (so-called generic drugs) formulated 
and marketed by numerous individual firms under generic or trademarked 
names have been evaluated for efficacy as a group without consideration of 
“therapeutic equivalence.” In the event that no evidence for pharmacologi-
cal availability or therapeutic efficacy in man can be presented for any of the 
drugs in the attached listing, their classifications of effectiveness may need to 
be modified if future regulations of the FDA require such proof.34
Recognizing the impossible burden that would be placed on generic 
manufacturers if accurate measures of therapeutic efficacy (in other 
words, clinical trial data) were required of all drugs, the PAC submitted 
instead that all drug manufacturers, in addition to providing evidence 
of chemical equivalence and purity already required by the FDA, should 
also adduce evidence of physiological availability “as judged by tests of 
disintegration, dispersion, and dissolution rates in appropriate solvents.” 
And “in every case in which there may be doubt of biological equiva-
lence . . . biological tests should be required.”35 In other words, the PAC 
argued that the FDA should require a modified NDA for all generic 
drugs, which should include proof that a generic drug was biologically—
and not just chemically—similar to the its brand-name equivalent. Until 
the FDA’s evaluation of generic drugs was made more rigorous, the PAC 
opposed any legislation that mandated generic prescribing. The DES’s 
findings thus stood in contrast to the recommendations of the Task Force 
on Prescription Drugs.36
That the two advisory bodies drew different conclusions reflected the 
divergent interests with which each group approached the issue of equiva-
lence. The leading academic physicians who constituted the DES were 
primarily concerned with fulfilling the FDA’s mandate of evaluating the 
33. Alfred Gilman, “Therapeutic Equivalence of Generic Drugs and Problems of Drug 
Formulation,” appendix A, minutes, Policy Advisory Committee of the Drug Efficacy Study, 
no. 3, March 27, 1968, NAS Archives, series 3 DES PAC 1968, Meetings folder, 27 Mar third.
34. William B. Castle, E. B. Astwood, Maxwell Finland, and Chester S. Keefer, “White 
Paper on the Therapeutic Equivalence of Chemically Equivalent Drugs. Prepared by a Sub-
committee of the Policy Advisory Committee, Drug Efficacy Study,” J. Amer. Med. Assoc. 208, 
no. 7 (1969): 1171–72, quotation on 1171. The views of the subcommittee reflected those 
of the broader Policy Advisory Committee.
35. Ibid, 1172.
36. Dominique A. Tobbell, “Allied against Reform: Pharmaceutical Industry-Academic 
Physician Relations in the United States, 1945–1970,” Bull. Hist. Med. 82, no. 4 (2008): 
878–912.
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efficacy of drugs marketed before 1962. In doing so they debated what 
should qualify as “substantial evidence” of efficacy, balancing pharmaco-
logical knowledge and incomplete or inadequate clinical data available on 
the marketed drugs with their own clinical experience of specific drugs. 
As the DES members made their evaluations they saw it as their task to 
create new scientific (and thus, ideally, objective) standards of efficacy 
that would eliminate subjectivity from the review process and guide future 
drug evaluations. In contrast, the government officials who made up the 
Task Force on Prescription Drugs had little interest in or expertise with 
which to debate the nuances of regulatory science. The Task Force’s prior-
ity instead was to assess the cost-effectiveness of competing drug products 
that had already received FDA approval. Their primary calculus thus was 
of economics, not of pharmaceutical science.
The work of a third advisory body contributed equally conflicting per-
spectives to the debate over therapeutic equivalence. Following publica-
tion of the Task Force’s report, the secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW) appointed a committee, led by Harvard political econo-
mist John Dunlop, to review its findings and recommendations. The so-
called Dunlop Committee was composed of nongovernmental officials 
drawn from a variety of backgrounds including physicians, academic and 
industry researchers, lawyers, and pharmacists. One of its priorities was 
to evaluate the issues of chemical, biological, and clinical equivalency in 
relation to current and proposed federal regulation, including the pro-
posed Medicare drug benefit.
At the conclusion of its review, the Dunlop Committee agreed that 
establishing the biological or therapeutic equivalency for generic drug 
products was important and would result in lower drug costs for the 
consumer. However, the individual members of the committee could 
not agree on whether current USP standards—and the FDA’s regulatory 
practices—guaranteed the therapeutic equivalence of generic drugs.37 
The attitudes of the review committee tended to align according to their 
institutional background. Those representing the generic drug industry 
and pharmacists—the beneficiaries of generics legislation—supported the 
Task Force’s findings, while those representing brand-name manufactur-
ers and the AMA believed the Task Force had understated the problem 
of therapeutic equivalence. Despite the lack of consensus, the committee 
officially recommended that the “Food and Drug Administration continue 
to develop Reference Standards for generic drugs to assure biological 
37. “Report of the Secretary’s Review Committee of the Task Force on Prescription Drugs” 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), 8–9.
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equivalency among drug products.”38 Implicit within this recommendation 
was an acknowledgment that current drug standards, those established 
by the USP, were lacking and that the FDA and not the USP should revise 
those standards. In doing so, the committee introduced a new timbre to 
the therapeutic equivalence debate: who should be the agency or institu-
tion responsible for the setting of drug standards?
A Moment in Pharmaceutical Time: The Bioavailability 
Conference of 1971
In the wake of the DES and the FDA’s subsequent implementation of its 
findings (known as the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation, DESI), aca-
demic pharmacists and pharmacologists along with government officials 
began to hold regular meetings to discuss standards creation and method 
formation for the twin problems of “therapeutic equivalence” and “physi-
ological availability.” In the regulatory lexicon the “equivalence” problem 
was increasingly linked to the problem of “bioavailability.”
At a seminal Washington conference in 1971, the dynamics of uncer-
tainty and conflict over turf were laid bare on the table. It was a juncture 
at which the standards of bioavailability had scarcely been developed; 
hence the conference was pivotal in American discourse because it came 
at a moment of uncertainty, a moment of multiple paths. The confer-
ence was held at the National Academy of Sciences but was organized 
by the FDA, particularly by Henry Simmons, director of the Bureau of 
Drugs. The most forceful voice at the conference was that of Gerhard 
Levy, pharmacy professor at the University of Buffalo and probably the 
dominant academic voice pointing to the invalidity of chemical equiva-
lence and urinalysis in examining bioavailability. Levy proclaimed that 
“[b]ioavailability problems are, in essence, problems concerning clinical 
effectiveness.” Referring to the DESI, Levy proclaimed that “the time has 
come to undertake a review of the bioavailability status of all those mar-
keted drugs which have not been assessed previously in this regard. The 
drug efficacy study [DES] . .  . can serve as a model for such a project; 
the Academy of Pharmaceutical Sciences may be the appropriate body 
to carry out this task.”39
38. Ibid., 9.
39. G. Levy, “Bioavailability, Clinical Effectiveness, and the Public Interest,” in Conference 
on Bioavailability of Drugs at the National Academy of Sciences, reprinted in Bioavailability 
of Drugs: Proceedings of the Conference on the Bioavailability of Drugs, ed. B. Brodie and W. M. 
Heller (Basel: S. Karger, 1972) (hereafter PCBD), pp. 29–39, quotation on 35. 
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Levy had been an outspoken critic of the weakness and backward char-
acter of USP and NF standards. Yet he argued at the 1971 gathering that 
the voluntary character of America’s standards-setting institutions was cen-
tral to the success of the American health system. “We can proudly point 
to the fact that our official standards of drug quality, as represented by 
the USP and the National Formulary, are not the result of governmental 
edict but derive solely from the efforts and sense of the responsibility of 
the health professions. Only we in the U.S. can make this claim.”40
Yet speakers after Levy worried about the voluntary character of stan-
dards that he otherwise praised. Standards would not be adopted widely 
in terms of method and practice, argued W. H. Barr of the University of 
Buffalo, until they were accompanied by an enforcement mechanism; “the 
past decade has provided us with sample evidence that formulation vari-
ables can greatly affect the bioavailability and thus the clinical efficacy of 
many important therapeutic agents. Numerous in vivo and in vitro meth-
ods have been developed to assess these affects. We have not yet success-
fully applied them, however, to develop effective bioavailability standards 
in the case of many drugs for which standards are clearly required.”41 The 
problem was the voluntary character of these institutions.
What can be done, and what should be done now, is to adopt a policy of full 
disclosure whereby manufacturers are required to include an appropriate 
statement in their product literature if the bioavailability of their product has 
not been established. . . . The disclosure of the bioavailability status of a drug 
product will permit more rational drug and drug product selection for the 
benefit of the patient and will serve also as a powerful stimulus for the prompt 
acquisition of adequate bioavailability information where such information is 
at present not available.42
University of Kentucky pharmacologist J. T. Dolusio expressed the prob-
lem more clearly.
There are often official standards regulating the manufacture of drug prod-
ucts. Unfortunately, at present these standards are only adequate with respect 
to insuring chemical equivalence. They emphasize things such as the purity of 
the drug, stability in dosage form, assay versus labeled potency, tablet to tablet 
to unit variation, etc.
40. Ibid., 33.
41. W. H. Barr, “The Use of Physical and Animal Models to Assess Bioavailability,” in 
PCBD, 55.
42. Levy, “Bioavailability” (n. 39), 39. See also G. Levy and E. Nelson, “USP and NF Stan-
dards, FDA Regulations and the Quality of Drugs,” N.Y. State J. Med. 61 (1961): 23.
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At present, there are no enforced standards which will insure bioavail-
ability. One thus encounters products on the market which indeed fulfill all 
requirements for chemical equivalence but which are potentially inefficient 
with respect to their therapeutic effect in the body. Only the ultimate develop-
ment of proper standards will insure that drug products are equivalent in all 
respects. This is why we are here.43
A month later in Montreal, Levy and Barr joined with other academic, gov-
ernmental, and industrial pharmacologists to assess the limitations of exist-
ing bioavailability standards and the implications for Canada’s regulatory 
practices.44 The conference included presentations by researchers from 
the Canadian government’s Health Protection Branch (HPB, formerly 
the FDD) documenting differences in bioavailability among chemically 
equivalent versions of hydrochlorothiazide and nitrofurantoin tablets. In 
response, Levy urged Canadian officials to incorporate “bioavailability test-
ing of generically equivalent drug products and periodic retesting of the 
innovator’s products” and clinicians to regularly monitor their patients’ 
drug levels using bioavailability studies. Levy reasoned that through these 
clinical pharmacokinetic studies, drug products could “be evaluated under 
realistic conditions in the appropriate population and without exposing 
normal subjects to unnecessary risks” and without relying on inadequate 
in vitro tests to evaluate a drug’s bioavailability.45 Ontario’s deputy minister 
of health, Allen Dyer, rejected Levy’s suggestion, noting that Ontario’s 
Ministry of Health “very strongly feel, that pharmaceutically equivalent 
products are, unless there is evidence to the contrary . . . therapeutically 
interchangeable.” Alarmed, Levy countered, “[t]hat puts us back just 
about 200 years in health care! You see, is it also true that in the absence 
of data to the contrary, all drugs should be considered safe and effective? 
How far do we go?”46 Heeding Levy’s warning and those of others, and 
acknowledging the growing number of studies from the United States 
showing the limits of bioavailability among seemingly equivalent drug 
products, Canada’s HPB began to accept as therapeutically equivalent 
generic drugs with 80 percent to 120 percent of the bioavailability of a 
43. J. T. Dolusio (Department of Pharmacology, University of Kentucky), in PCBD, 
153.
44. L. P. Chenier and G. Maner, “Perspectives in Bioavailability of Drugs. Therapeutic 
and Toxicological Significance,” Revue Canadienne de Biologie 32, supplement (1973): 1–182.
45. Gerhard Levy, “Future of Bioavailability Studies,” Revue Canadienne de Biologie 32, 
supplement (1973): 171–76, quotation on 175.
46. Gerhard Levy, Allen Dyer, George H. Schneller, Denys Cook, and Alan H. Conney, 
“Discussion,” Revue Canadienne de Biologie 32, supplement (1973): 177–82, quotations on 
179–81.
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reference standard (usually the innovator brand product). Availability was 
still assessed largely through excretion tests, but Canada’s early practices 
provided a partial model for emulation among American regulators and 
standard setters.
Yet by November 1973, the HPB had reevaluated its stance toward 
generic equivalence. A series of studies published in Canada, the United 
States, and Britain between 1971 and 1973 had made clear that for some 
drugs 80 percent bioavailability produced dangerously inadequate clini-
cal effects in patients while for other drugs 120 percent bioavailability led 
patients to suffer serious drug toxicity.47 Abolishing the 80 percent ruling, 
the HPB stated the “decision as to the acceptable range of bioavailability 
should be made separately for each drug based on a knowledge of such 
factors as the dose-effect curve of the drug, the therapeutic range, the 
nature of dose-related toxicities and the therapeutic use of the drug.”48
Some of the most important studies influencing the Canadian gov-
ernment’s ruling documented the inequivalence—and resulting clinical 
effects—of different commercial preparations of digoxin. In October 
1971, Finnish researchers reported in the British medical journal, the Lan-
cet, that two different commercial preparations of digoxin were absorbed 
in vivo at significantly different rates. Because digoxin toxicity was a well-
documented risk of digoxin therapy, the Finnish team proposed, “If the 
patient is well established on a given preparation, unnecessary changes 
may increase the hazards of digoxin therapy and should be avoided.”49 
An editorial two months later repeated the caution, warning readers that 
“[c]hanges in source of the digoxin tablet without knowledge of the phy-
sician or patient may lead either to reduction in therapeutic efficacy or 
to risk of digitalis intoxication.” The editorial went on to note the inad-
equacy of British Pharmacopoeia (BP) requirements for tablet disintegra-
tion (the existing measure of equivalence) and suggested that for drugs 
with low ratios of therapeutic dose to toxic dose (such as digoxin), “non-
47. E.g., D. C. Blair, R. W. Barnes, E. L. Wildner, and W. J. Murray, “Biological Availability 
of Oxytetracycline HCl Capsules,” J. Amer. Med. Assoc. 215 (1971): 251–54; J. Lindenbaum, M. 
H. Mellow, M. O. Blackstone, and V. P. Butler, “Variation in Biologic Availability of Digoxin 
from Four Preparations,” New Engl. J. Med. 285 (1971): 1344–47; and C. Macleod, H. Rabin, 
J. Ruedy, M. Caron, D. Zarowny, and R. O. Davies, “Comparative Bioavailability of Three 
Brands of Ampicillin,” Can. Med. Assoc. J. 107, no. 3 (1972): 203–9. 
48. J. Ruedy, R. O. Davies, J. Brodeur, N. A. Hinton, I. R. Innes, A. Nantel, and J. M. 
Parker, “Bioavailability: Report of the Special Advisory to the Health Protection Branch, 
DNH&W,” Can. Med. Assoc. J. 109 (1973): 920–22, quotation on 920–21. 
49. Vesa Manninen, John Melin, and Gottfried Härtel, “Serum-digoxin Concentrations 
during Treatment with Different Preparations,” Lancet 298, no. 7730 (1971): 934–35, quo-
tation on 935.
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equivalence of preparations should be assumed until the characteristics 
of absorption have been demonstrated.”50
After several studies confirmed the findings of the Finnish team, British 
clinical pharmacologists urged the BP to revise its standards for equiva-
lence.51 As D. G. Grahame-Smith of the Medical Research Council’s Unit 
of Clinical Pharmacology, Oxford, and John Hamer of St. Bartholomew’s 
Hospital, London, wrote,
Plainly the time has come to examine closely the procedures ensuring that 
preparations which can be dispensed as digoxin tablets B.P. have the same bio-
availability. This is no academic point. Therapy with digitalis [digoxin] prepara-
tions is difficult enough, and the margin between therapeutic and toxic doses 
is small; likely therapeutic problems arise if the bioavailability of digoxin is too 
small. . . . We would suggest that the present standards, which, while ensuring 
that the amount of digoxin in the tablet is correct, do not ensure predictable 
bioavailability, are inadequate. We would strongly urge that this matter of the 
correlations between the method of pharmaceutical preparation, the physical 
properties of digoxin tablets, and the bioavailability of digoxin in man be fully 
investigated and new standards introduced.52
Britain’s regulatory agency, the Medicines Commission, followed suit in 
September 1972 by requiring drug firms to submit bioavailability data 
in order to secure approval of new drug products. This did not appease 
the concerns of British pharmacologists. As the University of Sheffield’s 
Robert N. Smith lamented, the commission “has not adopted the FDA’s 
approach in commissioning comparative bioavailability studies on drugs, 
such as digoxin, which have been on the market for some years.” Smith 
referred in particular to the work of the DES and the Task Force on 
Prescription Drugs. The problem, Smith continued, was that the British 
“[g]overnment would have to provide sufficient funds to support these 
studies and find suitably qualified units to perform them. Unlike North 
America there are few academic or hospital departments in Britain ori-
ented to this type of work and with the necessary expertise in pharmaco-
kinetics.” Instead, the British government looked to the FDA for guidance 
on how to establish appropriate pharmaceutical standards.53
50. “Editorial: Biological Availability of Drugs,” Lancet 299, no. 7741 (1972): 83.
51. Vesa Manninen, John Melin, and Pentti Reissel, “Tablet Disintegration: Possible Link 
with Biological Availability of Digoxin,” Lancet 299, no. 7748 (1972): 490–91; T. R. D. Shaw, 
M. R. Howard, and John Hamer, “Variation in the Biological Availability of Digoxin,” Lancet 
300, no. 7772 (1972): 303–7.
52. John Hamer and D. G. Grahame-Smith, “Bioavailability of Digoxin,” Lancet 300, no. 
7772 (1972): 325.
53. Robert N. Smith, “Generic Equivalence and Non-Equivalence of Drugs,” Lancet 300, 
no. 7776 (1972): 528–30, quotation on 529.
05_85.1carpenter.indd   117 4/7/11   10:24 AM
118 daniel carpenter and dominique a. tobbell
The Discourse on Bioavailability: Regulatory Policy in 
Ambiguous Evolution
The crucial linkage between bioequivalence and bioavailability was estab-
lished in the late 1960s, less in discourse than in practice: the administra-
tive evaluation of what were then termed “abbreviated new drug applica-
tions” (ANDAs). The ANDA process was established formally in regulations 
issued in February 1969 as a way for the FDA to deal with the DES findings. 
During the DES, numerous drugs were found to be “possibly effective” or 
“ineffective” for some of the claims listed in its labeling. In these cases, the 
FDA gave manufacturers two years to submit clinical data showing their 
drug’s effectiveness for the stated claims. It was up to the manufacturers 
whether or not they did the clinical trials necessary to provide such data. 
Alternatively, the manufacturer could remove the ineffective ingredient 
from the drug, change the drug’s label so as to omit the indication for 
which there was no evidence of effectiveness, or challenge the FDA’s rul-
ing in a hearing. In order to speed up the review process by which manu-
facturers could submit additional clinical data on their drug, rather than 
require the manufacturer to submit an entirely new and complete NDA, 
the FDA introduced the ANDA. At the core of the standards for ANDA 
approval was a demonstration not only of chemical equivalence but also 
of biological equivalence, and hence “biological availability.”54
Marion Finkel, deputy director of the Bureau of Drugs, addressed 
the trade association of (non-brand-name) generic manufacturers, the 
National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, on February 4, 
1971. She offered a general message of assurance to drug makers who 
were deeply concerned that bioavailability requirements would necessitate 
wholesale clinical trials for their products. “If there is no methodology for 
determining bioavailability of certain agents, and if the FDA feels that the 
sponsor cannot develop ‘adequate methods within a reasonable time,’ the 
agency will opt either for clinical trials or dissolution tests. How it decides 
will vary with the seriousness of the disease to be treated and the need to 
assure therapeutic availability of the drug.”55
Yet in crucial ways, Finkel and her colleagues intended to place a new 
burden of proof (and of labor) upon the generic manufacturers. “It will 
be the responsibility of the company to adequately ascertain from the 
54. Federal Register 34 (February 27, 1969): 2673; Jerome Philip Skelly, “A History of 
Biopharmaceutics in the Food and Drug Administration 1968–1993,” AAPS J. 12, no. 1 
(March 2010): 44–50.
55. “FDA: Bio-Data Is OK Substitute for Clinical Trials on Some Drugs,” Drug Trade News, 
February 22, 1971, 51. On Finkel’s FDA career, see Carpenter, Reputation and Power (n. 4), 
chap. 5.
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literature and appropriate consultants whether a bioavailability method 
exists or is feasible to develop.” Finkel’s argument was that an ANDA 
must employ a tablet disintegration test at the very least, yet her rhetoric 
pointed clearly to supplementary examinations, including the desirability 
of plasma studies. “The tablet disintegration test has been a useful regula-
tory criterion. However, it possesses only limited value for predicting the 
comparative bioavailability of two purportedly similar dosage forms.”56 
Finkel advised manufacturers to check with FDA before undertaking any 
bioavailability tests (blood levels, urinary excretion, pharmacologic and 
metabolic assays). After consultation with internal experts or outside 
consultants, “FDA will either give a go-ahead or ask for modifications.” 
Given the eight-year experience with the three-phase system of clinical 
development under the vast IND system, Finkel’s pronouncement, along 
with the 1969 rules, implied some regulation and veto control over phase 
I and animal studies. In that three-phase system, phase I corresponded to 
the first human experiments to determine toxicity and dosage, phase II 
covered initial trials of a limited number of patients for specific disease 
control, and phase III corresponded to a full-scale randomized controlled 
clinical trial to assess drug safety and efficacy.57
In administrative practice, FDA reviewing divisions were already 
demanding the same sort of data specificity that they would require of a 
NDA for a new molecular entity. In its evaluation of NDA 16-815 (hydro-
chlorothiazide tablets, manufactured by Zenith Laboratories in Hoboken, 
N.J.), the FDA required the submission of data to establish bioavailability 
and bioequivalence (to the pioneer brand Hydrodiuril) for two dosage 
forms of hydrochlorothiazide tablets. These were submitted in lieu of clini-
cal trials to support safety. In principle, FDA statistician Walter Sloboda 
would have accepted the submission for the purpose of review, but he 
declined to do so. His division was unable to “conduct a statistical evalu-
ation” of Zenith’s data because
a.  No narrative or interpretation of the results of this study are given. No 
details are provided with reference to the study regimen, the design, nor 
the method by which treatments were allocated.
b.  No explanation is given of the coding which is used for the computer 
printout sheets. No details are provided concerning the computer pro-
gram which was used for the statistical analysis.
c.  Copies of the original laboratory analyses are not included in the 
submission.
d.  A number of pages have missing data.
56. “FDA: Bio-Data” (n. 55), 51.
57. Ibid.
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The upshot of these deficiencies was that “we are thus unable to deter-
mine what the submitted data mean or how to interpret this submission.” 
To provide a hard incentive for Zenith Laboratories to meet these data 
standards, Sloboda recommended that his superiors refuse to meet with 
Zenith officials until the data were provided in a proper form.58
By the time of the 1971 National Academy of Sciences conference on 
bioavailability, FDA commissioner Charles Edwards could speak authori-
tatively on the need for demonstration of bioavailability in any and all 
NDAs, including generic applications.
The time has passed when chemical equivalency can be considered the sole 
criterion of acceptability by a manufacturer for marketing a drug, the safety 
and efficacy of whose reference standard has previously been demonstrated in 
clinical trials. . . . Biological availability data in lieu of clinical trials are, there-
fore, required for (1) all products suitable for abbreviated new drug applica-
tions, providing a methodology is feasible, and (2) for all revised formulations 
of previously approved drugs (which were originally found effective in clinical 
trials), again assuming methodology is feasible.59
The upshot of these considerations was that demonstration of bio-
equivalence for an ANDA required demonstration of equivalence in 
availability at the target site.
Despite these changes in practice, changes in formal institutions—
namely the NDA and the administrative and experimental barriers that 
it created for market entry—were slow in coming. Generic drug makers 
still had to file a “paper NDA” in order to satisfy the requirements of the 
FDA approval process for molecular entities. This process demanded 
an administrative and structural liaison with the FDA that few generic 
manufacturers possessed, and it also required the completion of many 
clinical trials. As two patent attorneys who followed the development of 
legislation would later notice, the NDA process became a sort of stand-in 
for the patent protection lost by brand-name manufacturers due to lags 
in FDA review of the original molecular entity.60
58. Memorandum from Walter Sloboda to Heino Trees (Division of Cardiopulmonary 
and Renal Drug Products), September 18, 1970, DF 505.8 (AF 30-841), RG 88, National 
Archives.
59. Edwards, “Welcome Address” to Conference on Bioavailability of Drugs at the 
National Academy of Sciences, reprinted in PCBD, 12.
60. Fox and Bennett, Legislative History (n. 2), iii. On the lengthening of new drug 
approval times see, Carpenter, Reputation and Power (n. 4), chap. 3.
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The Return of Legislative Politics
The organizational battle between the USP and the FDA was in full force, 
but the critical audience—the U.S. Congress—was increasingly convinced 
that USP standards were not sufficiently enforceable or stringent. In 1973, 
as the Senate Subcommittee on Health chaired by Edward Kennedy began 
new hearings on the pharmaceutical industry, the issue of generic drug 
equivalence standards—and their regulatory ramifications—was prominent.
On the opening day of the Kennedy hearings, HEW secretary Caspar 
Weinberger introduced the department’s proposal to limit reimbursement 
for drug purchases under federal programs, including Medicare and Med-
icaid, to “the lowest price at which the drug is generally available, unless 
there is demonstrated difference in the therapeutic effect.”61 Despite the 
problems identified by the Dunlop Committee and DES, the so-called 
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) program was predicated on the assump-
tion that “uniform quality and therapeutic equivalence of drugs can be 
and is being assured.”62 The PMA opposed the HEW policy on the grounds 
that “medically and scientifically, there is a uniform opinion that equiva-
lency cannot be assumed today, and that is exactly what Weinberger’s 
proposal is bottomed on.”63 Despite the incorporation of bioequivalence 
into ANDAs, PMA president Joseph Stetler contended the FDA was in 
no position to guarantee the quality or effectiveness of different versions 
of the same drug. He warned that rather than being closer to a solution 
on the issue of equivalence, reports of the therapeutic inequivalence of 
generic drugs were increasing. As evidence, Stetler cited the Department 
of Defense’s rejection of 42 percent of drug samples submitted to it—the 
majority of which had been approved by the FDA—because they failed to 
meet the department’s own quality control standards. Included within the 
department’s quality assurance standards was detailed proof of a drug’s 
therapeutic equivalence as determined by laboratory tests, animal studies, 
and clinical trial data.64 Stetler blamed the failures in “quality control” on 
the FDA, noting that FDA inspections of drug plants had been decreas-
ing in frequency. While the 1962 Drug Amendments required the FDA 
61. FDC Reports, December 19, 1973, pp. A1–A7, quotation on A6. 
62. “Statement of C. Joseph Stetler,” Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973–1974. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 
93rd Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (hereafter the Kennedy Hearings), December 19, 1973, 
336–63, quotation on 336. 
63. Ibid., 337.
64. “Clinical Equivalency Proof for Military Drug Purchase,” FDC Reports, May 1, 1967; 
Max Feinberg, “How We Seek Quality in Competitive Drug Procurement,” Pharmacy Times, 
December 1973, 36–41.
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to inspect drug manufacturers at least every two years, Stetler argued that 
some drug manufacturers had not been inspected for five years, while 
others had never been inspected.65
Despite their economic stake in the outcome of the hearings, generic 
manufacturers were conspicuously absent during the Kennedy hearings 
and the political and legislative debates that followed. Constrained by 
a lack of resources and by the nebulous character of the generic drug 
industry, the trade association of small generic firms, the National Associa-
tion of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, held no political power. Support 
for the MAC program was left instead to nascent consumer and patient 
advocacy groups such as Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen, state and munici-
pal health agencies seeking to reduce their health care costs, and the 
American Pharmaceutical Association, which represented a core segment 
of organized pharmacy (notably, however, all other pharmacy groups 
joined with organized medicine and brand manufacturers in opposing 
the MAC program).
In stark contrast to the generic manufacturers, brand-name manufac-
turers were, by the early 1970s, a well-organized and politically unified 
industry possessing an extensive public relations and political affairs 
machinery. Since the mid-1950s, the industry—represented by the 
NPC and PMA—had organized a series of political and public relations 
campaigns against pharmaceutical reform legislation, including that of 
generic substitution and mandatory generic prescribing. The NPC’s anti-
substitution campaign of the 1950s, for example, had resulted in forty-four 
states passing antisubstitution legislation by the end of that decade (ban-
ning pharmacists from dispensing a generic drug in place of a prescribed 
brand-name drug).66 More recently, the press had accused the PMA of 
pressuring the White House to withdraw its support for the appointment 
of a staunch advocate of generic prescribing to the position of director 
of the FDA’s Bureau of Medicine.67 At the end of the 1970s, the National 
Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers accused brand-name manu-
facturers of “successfully using scare tactics to keep doctors prescribing, 
pharmacists dispensing, and patients requesting the more expensive 
brand-name drugs when there are cheaper generic versions available.”68
65. “Statement of C. Joseph Stetler” (n. 62), 337.
66. See Tobbell, “Pharmaceutical Networks” (n. 13), esp. 96–134; Tobbell, “Who’s Win-
ning?” (n. 6); and Tobbell, “Allied against Reform” (n. 36).
67. E. W. Kenworthy, “Doctor Suggests Drug Men Denied Him Post in FDA,” New York 
Times, August 26, 1969, 1.
68. Gina B. Kolata, “Large Drug Firms Fight Generic Substitution,” Science 206 (Novem-
ber 30, 1979): 1054–56, quotation on 1054.
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During the congressional debate over the MAC program, Stetler 
blamed the FDA’s failings on a shortage of labor and resources, while Sec-
retary Weinberger and FDA officials denied such charges and maintained 
the FDA was able to ensure the equivalence of generic drugs. Stetler’s 
arguments against the MAC policy represent a deft political maneuver by 
the PMA. Whereas the industry’s political strategy in the 1960s had been to 
criticize the lack of generic drug regulation (i.e., that no bioequivalence or 
clinical equivalence data were required by the FDA for generic approval), 
in the early 1970s that strategy had shifted to casting doubt on the abil-
ity of the FDA—which was now evaluating bioequivalence—to fulfill its 
regulatory responsibilities, a central feature of the “drug lag” debates that 
dominated pharmaceutical politics throughout the 1970s.69
Just as they had during the Nelson hearings, the industry’s arguments 
stemmed from legitimate scientific and regulatory concerns. In the hopes 
of resolving the lingering uncertainty about generic drug equivalence stan-
dards, Kennedy referred the matter to the Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA). The Drug Bioequivalence Study Panel of the OTA, chaired 
by Robert Berliner, dean of Yale’s School of Medicine, and composed of 
several leading academic physicians and pharmacists, was charged with 
addressing whether the FDA could “guarantee bioequivalence of multi-
source drug products under the present regulations.”70
In July 1974, the Berliner Committee concluded, “present compendia 
standards and guidelines for Good Manufacturing Practice do not insure 
[sic] quality in uniform bioavailability for drug products.” As such, “cur-
rent standards and regulatory practices do not insure [sic] bioequivalence 
for drug products.”71 The system of standards setting was, in essence, bro-
ken. The culprit, the committee contended, was the voluntary nature of 
the system and the resulting lack of resources available to the institutions 
charged with developing and revising drug standards, the USP and NF. 
The committee argued that the “continued reliance” of these institu-
69. In the early 1970s, clinical pharmacologists Louis Lasagna and William Wardell 
argued that as a direct result of the 1962 Drug Amendments the U.S. pharmaceutical indus-
try had made significantly fewer pharmaceutical innovations and as a result the public’s 
health was suffering. Louis Lasagna and William M. Wardell, Regulation and Drug Development 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975). See also 
Arthur A. Daemmrich, “Invisible Monuments and the Costs of Pharmaceutical Regulation: 
Twenty-Five Years of Drug Lag Debate,” Pharm. Hist. 45 (2003): 3–17.
70. Senator Edward Kennedy, Opening Statement, Brand Names and Generic Drugs, 
1974. Kennedy Hearings, July 22, 1974, 1.
71. Drug Bioequivalence Study Panel, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, “Drug Bio-
equivalence” (Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, 1974), 1–78, quotations 
on 1, 2. (Online copy at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/7401.pdf.)
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tions “upon such limited resources is anachronistic and inadequate for 
the scientific activities necessary to insure pharmaceutical equivalence 
of drug products.”72 Essential to fixing the system was, the committee 
argued, the establishment of “a single organization,” federally funded, “to 
supersede the USP and NF as the official standard-setting organization of 
the Federal Government.”73 Although reluctant to recommend a specific 
organizational location for the new standards-setting body, the commit-
tee suggested the FDA might assume responsibility for the setting of drug 
standards, as long as the standards-setting group remained separate from 
the agency’s compliance-monitoring group.74
The upgrading of drugs standards and the feasibility of HEW’s MAC 
program, however, required more than just organizational change. As with 
the earlier advisory bodies, the Berliner Committee concluded that it was 
“neither feasible nor desirable that studies of bioavailability be conducted 
for all drugs or drug products.”75 By identifying only those drugs for which 
bioavailability studies were critical, the setting of generic drug equivalent 
standards could be rationalized. In particular, the committee reasoned, 
drugs with a narrow margin between therapeutic dose and toxicity “would 
be candidates for testing of bioavailability, since relatively modest changes 
in the concentration achieved in body fluids might well be associated with 
large changes in the frequency of therapeutic failure or significant toxic-
ity.”76 Such drugs included digoxin, corticosteroids, and certain antibiotics 
such as chloramphenicol. In contrast, for any drug for which there was a 
large margin between its effective concentration and its toxic level, such 
as penicillin, “[m]oderate differences in the concentration achieved in 
the blood owing to differences in bioavailability . . . would be easily tol-
erated.”77 In other words, two classes of drugs should be distinguished: 
those for which evidence of bioequivalence is not considered essential and 
those for which evidence of bioequivalence (and thus bioavailability data) 
is critical. In the case of the latter, bioequivalence requirements should 
become a feature of a drug’s dose-response curve or toxicological profile.
Based on this two-class distinction, the committee recommended the 
establishment of an official list of interchangeable drug products. Those 
drugs for which evidence of bioequivalence was not considered essential 







05_85.1carpenter.indd   124 4/7/11   10:24 AM
Bioequivalence 125
onstrated. Those drugs for which evidence of bioequivalence (and thus 
bioavailability data) was deemed critical could be listed only after bioavail-
ability data had been provided and approved.78 At the policy level, the 
MAC program would apply to only those drugs listed as interchangeable.
Neither the Berliner Committee’s report nor the Kennedy hearings 
brought complete closure to the issue of bioequivalence. Although 
the MAC program was officially announced in 1975, the first MAC pro-
grams—for penicillin and ampicillin—did not become effective until June 
1977, and subsequent MAC programs were introduced only slowly and 
sporadically, as and when the FDA was able to guarantee the therapeutic 
equivalence of participating drugs. Yet by late 1974, numerous observers 
had concluded that the FDA had taken over standard setting in matters 
of availability. In revising their classic textbook The Pharmacological Basis 
of Therapeutics, Louis Goodman and Alfred G. Gilman, Jr. (son of the 
Nobel laureate) noted that the FDA had displaced the USP. As Goodman 
reminded the young Gilman in correspondence over revisions on New 
Year’s Eve in 1974, “The bioavailability (plasma conc.) area is pre-empted 
by FDA, not USP, for the present.”79
The plasma concentration discussion was also furthered by develop-
ments in pharmacokinetics that used simulation and analytic techniques 
to assess the area under the time-concentration curve (AUC). The AUC 
was calculated by estimating the time-concentration curve (much like 
the one depicted in Lloyd Miller’s notes on tolbutamide in Figure 1), 
and pharmacokineticists used different techniques for integrating the 
“mass” under that curve. The methods for performing these calculations 
were readily available from pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and they relied upon features of linear mathemat-
ics that rendered serum-based tests relatively easy to apply and interpret 
statistically and clinically.80 Applying the concept of linearity to pharma-
cokinetics, pharmacologists assumed that although variations in dosage, 
inactive ingredients, and form of drug administration could affect the 
absorption of a drug’s active ingredient into the blood and thus affect 
its bioavailability, those same differences in dosage, inactive ingredients, 
and administration would not affect the way by which availability in the 
78. Ibid., 55.
79. Goodman to Alfred G. Gilman, Jr., December 31, 1974, “No info available re a 1975 
European Pharmacopoeia. The bioavailability (plasma conc.) area is pre-empted by FDA, 
not USP, for the present,” Louis Goodman Papers, Alfred G. Gilman folder, Marriott Uni-
versity Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.
80. Sharon Anderson and Walter W. Hauck, “Consideration of Individual Bioequiva-
lence,” J. Pharmacokinetics Pharmacodynamics 18, no. 3 (June 1990): 259–73, esp. 260, 268.
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blood translated into availability to drug targets. In this rendering, bio-
availability data (calculated from serum-based tests) would correspond to 
bioequivalence at the drug target site.81
The Codification of an Administrative Vocabulary:  
Hatch–Waxman and the Modern Generic Drug System
The critical regulation making occurred in the late 1970s with three 
officials in the lead—J. Richard Crout (director of the Bureau of Drugs), 
hematology specialist Bernard Cabana, and FDA physician John Harter. 
Crout’s Bureau of Drugs was arguably the most powerful middle-level 
organization within the FDA, and the Bureau of Drugs had its own rule-
writing team. Cabana was a critical force in the development of the rules. 
He was director of the Division of Biopharmaceutics, and his training at 
SUNY–Buffalo (with Gerhard Levy and W. H. Barr) and his previous expe-
rience at Bristol Laboratories had given him an excellent and legitimized 
professional perch from which to orchestrate the marriage of bioavail-
ability and bioequivalence.82
The wedding of bioavailability to bioequivalence became formal in a 
series of FDA rules issued and published in the Federal Register from 1973 
to 1977.83 As with an amended NDA process, the series of critical court 
victories won by the FDA was absolutely essential in empowering the 
agency with the legal authority and the regulatory moxie to issue these 
broad and far-reaching standards. The Hynson decision and others from 
the federal courts basically established the authority of FDA to set experi-
mental standards and apply them without full administrative hearings in 
each case where applied.84 Crout, Cabana, and Harter’s efforts became 
official with the publication of the first “Orange Book” listing therapeu-
tically equivalent products in January 1979 (see Figure 2). The Orange 
Book was in formality a “proposal”—a setting forth of provisional rules 
in the Federal Register—but very little about the rules would change from 
proposed to final form. Perhaps most centrally, the January 1979 proposal 
81. Victor Smolen, “Bioavailability and Pharmacokinetic Analysis of Drug Responding 
Systems,” Annu. Rev. Pharmacol. Toxicol. 18 (1978): 495–522.
82. Skelly, “History of Biopharmaceutics” (n. 54), 47.
83. Federal Register 38 (January 22, 1974): 885; Federal Register 40 (June 20, 1975): 26164; 
Federal Register 42 (January 7, 1977): 1624; Federal Register 42 (August 23, 1977): 4231.
84. Robert Spencer, “Bioequivalence/Bioavailability—The FDA’s Plans,” Food, Drug 
Cosmetic Law J. 31 (1976): 32–38; Bernard Cabana, “Bioavailability/Bioequivalence,” Food, 
Drug Cosmetic Law J. 32 (1977): 512–26; James T. Dolusio, “A Definition of Bioequivalence/
Bioavailability and a Historical Perspective,” Food, Drug Cosmetic Law J. 32 (1977): 506–11.
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included model legislation for generic substitution in state Medicaid 
formularies, legislation that was drafted between Crout’s team and the 
Federal Trade Commission. The role of regulation in standardizing not 
merely scientific concepts but also policy proposals has been little nar-
rated from this period.
The rule making of Crout, Cabana, and Harter accomplished much 
more than the solidification of regulatory practices. It also eased the path 
of legislation several years later. In two ways, the Bureau of Drugs’s rule 
making changed the policy making game. First, the Bureau of Drugs had 
solidified concepts and procedures, and by so doing, its rules reduced legis-
lators’ and bargaining parties’ uncertainty. It would, in the 1980s, be much 
easier for all parties to strike a feasible trade-off once the basic concepts 
Figure 2. Origins of the “Orange Book”: FDA Bureau of Drugs’s Proposed Bio-
equivalence Regulations and Listings, January 1979.
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85. Mossinghoff, “Overview” (n. 2), 187.
86. Fox and Bennett, Legislative History (n. 2), 2, 213.
had been pinned down. Evidence of this comes in the minimal legislative 
revision of the Hatch–Waxman provisions in Congress. Second, the threat 
of rule making brought the political representatives of the American phar-
maceutical industry more eagerly to the table. In the absence of steady rule 
making development, the organized pharmaceutical industry was happy 
to witness a fallback to the status quo, wherein generic manufacturers 
would have to file a “paper NDA” that required either new clinical trials or 
published trials that demonstrated the efficacy of its product. As the FDA 
began to create a generic drug approval process on its own, however, the 
fallback option became not the paper NDA but whatever the FDA’s Bureau 
of Drugs would create as an administrative system.
Bioequivalence standards effected through rule making, then, provided 
not only a conceptual framework but a political incentive for Hatch–
Waxman’s enactment. With the FDA’s rule making for a generic drug 
approval process proceeding apace in the late 1970s, the brand-name 
manufacturers were caught in a bind. The bald choice was to resist the 
rule making with uncertain prospects for legislative or legal victory or 
strike a deal to accept a generic drug approval process in statute while 
getting something out of the bargain. As a former PMA president noted, 
brand-name manufacturers chose the latter.
For those who ask whether Hatch–Waxman was a good deal or a bad deal for 
the research-based pharmaceutical industry, the most learned response is: It 
was not a good deal, unless one believed that FDA was going to go forward with 
its plans to implement abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) through 
regulation. If one thought that was going to happen—and FDA was working 
on it—then Hatch–Waxman probably was a good balance. If one did not think 
that would ever happen, Hatch–Waxman probably was not a good balance, at 
least at the time.85
The Hatch–Waxman legislation experienced many changes in the House 
and Senate, and as well in the conference committee. But the provi-
sions relating to bioequivalence, bioavailability, and ANDAs were largely 
unchanged from the original measure. They were also little altered from 
the FDA regulations issued in January 1979.86
The deal that had so long eluded members of Congress on generic 
drugs was able to be struck because the concepts were in place for a 
legislative bargain. Indeed, the legislation limited the FDA’s discretion 
in one important sense, namely that the agency could impose no more 
stringent or less stringent requirements than were contained in the ANDA 
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regulations. Hence both generic and brand-name manufacturers could 
regard the FDA’s ANDA regulations as the final and stable word on what 
a generic drug pathway to market would look like. Once in place, the 
American nexus between equivalence and availability began to spread to 
other countries and international institutions. This development occurred 
in complicated ways, at cross-cultural and cross-institutional interfaces, 
and merits a separate study.87
The Hatch–Waxman Act offered generic and brand-name manufactur-
ers more than side payments in a larger legislative bargain. It also offered 
stability in regulation and a template of predictability for the future. For 
brand-name manufacturers, the act offered the certainty of patent exten-
sion; for generic manufacturers, a path to the market was clear. And for 
both sides, the act reduced uncertainty over policy developments by codi-
fying present procedures and ensuring that future rule making would be 
unlikely to depart from the Hatch–Waxman compromise, at least for a 
while. Brand-name companies could rest assured that no change in per-
sonnel or thinking at the FDA would permit generic drugs to come onto 
the market more cheaply or with less testing than under the ANDA pro-
cedure. For generic companies in particular, the act reduced uncertainty 
by reining in the FDA’s discretion to alter testing requirements for generic 
drugs. Title I of Hatch–Waxman textually authorizes ANDAs and prohibits 
the FDA from doing anything beyond asking for bioavailability studies.88
Blood serum bioavailability still comprises the dominant criterion of 
comparability for generic and pioneer drugs among small-molecule phar-
maceuticals. From 1982 to 1992, the FDA operated under a set of rules, 
perhaps the most prominent known as the 75/75 rule, which stipulated 
that similarity required at least 75 percent of subjects in an equivalence 
study to have bioavailability within at least 75 percent of the pioneer stan-
dard. The rule thus relied heavily upon “within-subject” variability and 
examined not only the average availability of the generic formulation but 
also its variance over a sample.89 The other common rule of the time, and 
which superseded the 75/75 rule on the basis of its perceived statistical 
87. Ibid., 23; Roger L. Nation and Lloyd N. Sansom, “Bioequivalence Requirements 
for Generic Products,” Pharmacol. Therap. 62 (1994): 41–55. On the spread of other FDA-
originated concepts and regulations around the modern pharmaceutical world, including 
twentieth-century India and its regulation of Ayurvedic medicines, see Carpenter, Reputa-
tion and Power (n. 4), chap. 11.
88. Mossinghoff, “Overview” (n. 2), 189.
89. Anderson and Hauck, “Consideration of Individual Bioequivalence” (n. 80), 266–67; 
Bernard E. Cabana, “Assessment of 75/75 Rule: FDA Viewpoint,” J. Pharmaceut. Sci. 72 
(1983): 98–99.
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superiority, is the 80/20 rule, which is also called the “plus-or-minus 20 
percent test.” This standard requires that the amount of active ingredient 
in the patient’s blood over a specified time interval must lie within 20 per-
cent, positive or negative, of the level observed with the pioneer version 
of the molecule. As one recent commentator suggests, the homogeneity 
of the FDA’s standards is open to question. Other “therapeutic bands” 
are possible, as “many medical professionals believe that for drugs that 
have a wide index of tolerance, twenty percent is not important at all, in 
such instances, twice as much or half as much of the active ingredient in 
a generic product will still work.”90 More narrow therapeutic bands may 
be appropriate for antiseizure medication or other indications where 
less variability is appropriate. Perhaps one indication of the breadth and 
stasis of the FDA’s standards is that, at this writing, they still engender 
complaint. Laments about the heterogeneity of availability and the ways 
that particular drug classes elude federal standards flow not only within 
academic networks but also in public arenas. A widely read article in the 
New York Times in December 2009—titled “Patient Money: Not All Drugs 
Are the Same After All”—questioned the uniformity of standards applied 
to molecular therapies in the American health system.91 
Whichever standard is used, the FDA’s standards of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s have become the starting point for scientific discussions 
and industry lobbying. Their status as target for scientific, industry, and 
medical criticism only confirms their centrality, their existence as default 
criteria. FDA officials were, as we have shown, not the sole authors of 
these rules, and the conceptual and methodological architecture of 
bioequivalence has been shaped by academic pharmacologists, by drug 
companies worried about the availability of their own preparations, and 
by the criticisms of consumer groups. The determination of equivalence 
as published in the Orange Book has become a target and a platform for 
pharmaceutical lobbying. Large pharmacy chains such as CVS Caremark 
routinely press the FDA for clearance of ANDAs—pointing to therapeutic 
equivalence determinations as the basis for their claims—in part because 
the availability of generics will increase total volume and will benefit total 
90. The 80/20 standard owed much to Canadian regulatory writings (see discussion on 
p. 115). It is likely, however, that the widespread acceptance of this standard in the global 
pharmaceutical world was facilitated by the FDA’s 1978 rules and the 1984 statute as well as 
the work of the FDA statistician. See Mossinghoff, “Overview” (n. 2), 190.
91. Leslie Alderman, “Patient Money: Not All Drugs Are the Same After All,” New 
York Times, December 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/health/19patient.
html?ref=health (accessed December 23, 2009). 
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pharmacy sales.92 And bioavailability standards measured and enforced 
through blood serum testing have become central to FDA decisions for 
NDAs for pioneer molecules as well, often in discussions over labeling 
where patient compliance is at issue.93
The USP and other organizations have not, to be sure, waned from 
relevance or visibility in the global pharmaceutical realm. The USP still 
maintains primary authorship over chemical purity, strength, and equiva-
lence standards (though these are largely enforced by the FDA and global 
medicines regulators through inspections, quality control regulations, 
and GMPs). However, the centrality of plasma analysis in bioequivalence 
implies that generic equivalence has largely become an issue tackled 
primarily by the FDA and other global medicines regulators who have 
transcended chemical analysis to orchestrate a blood-based methodology 
and discourse of availability and equivalence of medicines.
As the nation and the world confront issues of comparative effectiveness 
of drugs as well as biosimilarity for biopharmaceuticals, the narrative of bio-
equivalence provides guidance for our collective dialogue. Regulatory are-
nas often provide sites for conceptual innovation as well as standardization.
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